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CHICHESTER v. COMMONWEALTH
448 S.E.2d 638 (Va. 1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On August 16, 1991, two black men wearing dark clothing and
armed with semi-automatic pistols entered a restaurant in the Manaport
Shopping Center in Manassas around closing time. The shorter of the
two men jumped over the service counter, leaving a footprint. This
assailant then ordered an employee to open one cash register from which
he obtained $100. Attempts to open the second register, however, failed.
As a result, the shorter man then entered the back room and returned with
the manager. The manager, unable to open the register, was subsequently
shot by the taller man. The bullet, piercing a major artery, caused the
manager to bleed to death. Chichester was later identified as one of the
two men running from the scene. 1
Chichester was arrested on January 7, 1992. In the first stage of a
bifurcated trial, ajury convicted Chichester of capital murder, robbery,
the use of a firearm in the commission of murder and the use of a firearm
during the robbery. In the second stage of the trial, the jury fixed his
punishment at death based on "future dangerousness."
'2
HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Chichester's death sentence
with his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld the conviction and death sentence.
3
I Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638 (1994)
2 Id.
3 Id. The defendant assigned twenty-six errors. The court, in turn,
rejected some of these contentions in brief, conclusive language. Others
did not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide
little if any guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law
to facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in these
categories that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1) the
death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, (2) electrocution as cruel
and unusual punishment, (3) additional peremptory challenges, (4) limits
on voir dire, (5) change of venue, (6) the admissibility of photographs,
(7) possession of a handgun, (8) insufficient evidence of guilt, (9)
exclusion ofjurors, (10) sequestering thejury, (11) prejudice of thejury,
and (12) prosecutorial default of an agreement.
4 Id. at 642.
5 1d.
6 Id.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18 (1990).
8 Defense counsel also sought a continuance. It should also be
noted that it is important that resources be sought on federal as well as
appropriate state law grounds. It is clear that general investigative
assistance was claimed on constitutional grounds. Regarding the motion
for continuance and the request for investigative assistance to locate two
particular witnesses, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia treated one
claim as a state law issue to be decided under an abuse of discretion
standard. Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 645.
9 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (when assistance is a basic tool of defense, the
defendantis entitled to the assistance of an expert anddenial of thisexpert
is a denial ofdueprocess). See case summary of Stewart, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 21 (1993) (an analysis of why Ake should be
relied upon when expert assistance is needed).
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Expert Testimony
A major issue faced by the defense in this case centered on expert
testimony concerning a shoe print found on the counter of the restaurant. 4
On this issue, a forensics expert for the Commonwealth compared this
print with shoes seized from the home of Shelton McDowell, another
suspect in the robbery.5 He testified that the impression made on the
counter matched the design, size and particular "identifying" small cut
in McDowell's shoe.6 Such testimony tended to identify Chichester as
the assailant standing in front of the counter and McDowell as the
assailant who jumped over the counter. This situation placed Chichester
as the triggerman, thus, eligible for the death penalty. 7 Although the
opinion indicates that Chichester sought resources in the form of inves-
tigative assistance,8 there is no reference to an attempt to secure appoint-
ment, under the authority of Ake v. Oklahoma,9 of a defense expert to
combat the critical shoeprint testimony. 10 An Ake expert might have
been sought to conduct a separate shoeprint analysis, to assist the defense
in cross-examination of the Commonwealth's expert, or to identify
weaknesses in the forensic science methodology. Although the expert at
issue inAke was a psychiatrist, such a request can apply to more than just
a mental health expert.1' The defense, however, carries the burden of
showing that an expert is essential to his defense and to deny such a
10 The only otherevidence lending to the identification ofChichester
as the triggerman consisted of evidence of an earlier similar robbery
where he had fired a weapon and testimony that he had remarked that "he
had a body on the gun." Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 643.
11 SeeLittle v.Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240,1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) ("There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric
and nonpsychiatric experts."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). See
also UnitedStates v.Patterson,724 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1984) (defendant
entitled to expert when expert testimony is pivotal); Williams v. Martin,
618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (defendant denied equal protection, due
process and effective assistance of counsel by court's failure to provide
a pathologist to assist with defense); United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d
823, 829 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant entitled to fingerprinting expert);
Washington v. State, 800 P.2d 252 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (Ake applied
to defendant's motion for psychiatrist, forensic odontologist and chem-
ist); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1989) (failure to grant
defendant's motion for fingerprint expert at public expense was revers-
ible error); State v. Carmouche, 528 So. 2d 159 (La. 1988), clarifying,
527 So. 2d. 307 (La. 1988) (in capital cases, "any reasonable request of
the defendant" for expert assistance "should be granted"; trial court
should have granted defendant's requests for "a neurologist and a
psychiatrist and any additional experts that these doctors deem neces-
sary," as well as "experts in fingerprint analysis and serology"); State v.
Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648,656-58 (N.C. 1988) (Ake extends to any expert
as to which defendant makes threshold showing of need, including, inter
alia, fingerprint expert); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1987)
(defendant entitled to intoxication expert to "assist him in the evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of his intoxication defense"); Thorton v.
State, 339 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. 1986) (defendant entitled to funds to employ
assistance of forensic dental expert).
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request would render a trial unfair.12 Although no court has created a
specific checklist of what establishes entitlement to an expert underAke,
courts have examined certain factors in the preliminary showing of
need. 13 In addition to such a listing, it is often helpful to make a showing
current problems associated with governmental forensic testing. Such
forensic testing has often been shown to demonstrate a pattern of
unreliability. 14 The advantages of such expert assistance are many and
a defendant would essentially be given a "defense consultant" in prepa-
ration and presentation of the case as well as cross-examination of
prosecution experts. Not every use of expert testimony by the Common-
wealth will entitle defendants to a corresponding expert. Nevertheless,
Ake is underutilized as a resource in Virginia.
II. Jury Issues
A. Batson v. Kentucky
The defense counsel made a challenge under the authority of Batson
v. Kentucky, 15 maintaining that the Commonwealth engaged in discrimi-
nation by peremptorily striking two prospective jurors solely because of
their race. Assuming that the defense had established aprimafacie case
of discrimination, the Supreme Court of Virginia evaluated the race-
neutral explanations proffered by the Commonwealth for the strikes
16
and found them not to be pretextual. It is not clear that any other avenue
was available to the defense in this case to question the Commonwealth's
peremptory strikes. Counsel are reminded, however, that support for
establishing Batson challenges can sometimes be found in disparity of
strikes 17 or disparity in voir dire. 18
The Supreme Court of Virginia accepted theprosecution's explana-
tion because the defense did not assert that the Commonwealth's expla-
nation was insufficient to rebut the presumption of invalid peremptory
strikes. 19 At this pointthe defense could have possibly focused on the
disparate treatment of similarly situated jurors who had not been chal-
lenged by the Commonwealth. Another possible avenue by which to
challenge a race-neutral explanation, deals with establishing a pattern of
prosecutorial discrimination in all cases.20
12 See Little v.Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240,1245 (8th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (where identification from victim was only evidence linking
defendant to the crime, and identification came after hypnosis, court
reversed and remanded defendant's post-conviction habeas petition
which found failure to appoint a hypnotist was not error), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
13 Factors important to courts evaluating Ake motions have in-
cluded: type of expert, type of assistance, name and qualifications of the
expert, reasonableness of the cost, objective bases for the request,
subjective basis for the request, legal necessity, legal entitlement to
defense experts, inadequacy of available state experts and supporting
information for all of these factors.
14 See Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4
Harv. J. Law & Tech. 109 (1991) (reports a consistent pattern of
unacceptable errors and inaccuracies among forensic crime labs); Decke,
Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 Cinn. L. Rev. 574, 577 (1982)
(reports on the unreliability of the overworked and often insufficiently
trained governmental crime lab employees). See also Imwinkelried, The
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory ReportsAgainst
Criminal Defendants, 30 Hastings L.J. 621, 623 (1979) (reports on the
high incidence of errors in police laboratory analysis); Bradford, Barri-
ers to Quality Achievement in Crime Laboratory Operations, 25 J.
Forensic Sci. 902, 905 (1980) ("fundamental errors in identification and
faulty methods have been found in numerous cases at the trial or trial
preparation phase").
B. Fair Cross-Section
Chichester also claimed that since only oneblack served on the jury,
he did notreceive a fairtrial due to an inadequate representation of blacks
that resided in the community.21 Rejection of this claim, in the form
presented, was proper. The proper granting of challenges for cause and
use of'peremptory challenges can lawfully result in a petit jury that does
not reflect the racial composition of a community. Defendants, however,
are guaranteed a venire representing a fair cross section of the commu-
nity, where no cognizable group is systematically excluded.
2 2
Underrepresentation of a group in the venire summoned for duty
establishes a prima facie case of systematic exclusion. 23 Although the
court correctly rejected Chichester's claim, it cited its opinion in Watkins
v. Commonwealth24 in doing so. The fair cross-section claim was
properly presented in Watkins and the Supreme Court of Virginia
misconstrued it. Assistance in investigating, preparing and presenting
fair cross-section claims is available from the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse and the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center.
M. Automatic Review
Again the Supreme Court of Virginia improperly employed its
default rules in exercise of its statutory obligation to review death
sentences.25 The court also rejected several contentions regarding
circumstances provoking passion or prejudice in the jury. One such
claim involved seating the family of the victim near the jury box.
Apparently an insufficientrecordwas part of the basis forrejection of this
claim. External factors, not ordinarily recorded by the court reporter are
often important to this type of claim. If they occur it is essential that
counsel assures that a record be made, even if the trial must be tempo-
rarily interrupted.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
15 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
16 The explanation was a stated belief that the prior experiences of
the prospectivejurors and their family members with the criminal justice
system might cause them to harbor bias or resentment against the
Commonwealth. Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 646-47.
17 Here, for example, if the Commonwealth had not exercised
peremptory strikes against white jurors who had bad experiences with the
criminal justice system.
18 Here, for example, if there were white jurors who had not been
questioned or were not questioned as extensively about involvement
with the court system.
19 Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 647.
20 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (in attacking
prosecutorial peremptory strikes, the defense "must, to pose the issue,
show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges againsi:
Negroes over a period of time").
21 Chichester, 448 S.E.2d at 647.
22 Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,347,385 S.E.2d 50, 52
(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Default has no place in statutorily mandated review of the record.
Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990). Seecasesummary of Mickens, Capita I
Defense Digest, this issue.
